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The pivotal quality of proximity graphs is connectivity, i.e. all nodes in the graph are connected
to one another either directly or via intermediate nodes. These types of graphs are robust, i.e., they
are able to function well even if they are subject to limited removal of elementary building blocks,
as it may occur for random failures or targeted attacks. Here, we study how the structure of these
graphs is affected when nodes get removed successively until an extensive fraction is removed such
that the graphs fragment. We study different types of proximity graphs for various node removal
strategies. We use different types of observables to monitor the fragmentation process, simple ones
like number and sizes of connected components, and more complex ones like the hop diameter and
the backup capacity, which is needed to make a network N − 1 resilient. The actual fragmentation
turns out to be described by a second order phase transition. Using finite-size scaling analyses we
numerically assess the threshold fraction of removed nodes, which is characteristic for the particular
graph type and node deletion scheme, that suffices to decompose the underlying graphs.
PACS numbers: 07.05.Tp, 64.60.an, 64.60.F-
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I. INTRODUCTION
The pivotal issue of standard percolation [1, 2] is con-
nectivity. A basic example is 2D random site percolation,
where one studies a lattice in which a random fraction
of the sites is “occupied”. Clusters composed of adja-
cent occupied sites are then analyzed regarding their ge-
ometric properties. Depending on the fraction p of occu-
pied sites, the geometric properties of the clusters change,
leading from a “fragmented” phase with rather small and
disconnected clusters to a phase, where there is basically
one large connected cluster covering the lattice. Therein,
the appearance of an infinite, i.e. percolating, cluster is
described by a second-order phase transition.
Similar to the issue of connectivity is the robustness,
i.e. the ability of networks to function well even if they
are subject to random failures or targeted attacks of their
elementary building blocks, e.g., node removal. This is
of particular importance for more applied real-world net-
works, which may fail even if they are still connected,
e.g., when the dynamics of nodes is not synchronous due
to an failure. Also, many real-world networks are not
embedded in two-dimensions, they may even exhibit an
infinite-dimensional, i.e., mean-field structure. E.g., elec-
trical power grids must ensure power supply for entire
resident population [3], urban road networks [4] and air-
line networks [5] facilitate social and economical inter-
action, and the internet [6], which has become essential
in almost all aspects of life. In general, networks are
represented by a set of nodes, i.e. the elementary build-
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ing blocks of a network, and pairs of nodes might be
joined by edges. One possibility to characterize a net-
work (or graph for that matter) is by means of its degree
distribution, where the degree of a node refers to the
number of its adjacent neighbors. Several real-world net-
works, such as the hyperlink-network of the internet, ex-
hibit a scale-free degree distribution [6]. During the last
decade, various studies have been published that focus on
this prototypical type of degree distribution. In particu-
lar, the fragmentation properties of scale-free Baraba´si-
Albert (BA) networks [7–12] (and also of several other
ones [13–17]) have been put under scrutiny. In the afore-
mentioned articles, different node-removal strategies have
been considered to investigate the fragmentation proper-
ties of the considered networks. It turns out that scale-
free networks are robust against random node removals,
but very vulnerable to intentional attacks targeting par-
ticular “important” nodes. Note that there are many
different local and global measures to quantify whether
a node is important. Popular choices are, e.g., the de-
gree of a node, its betweenness-centrality [18] (subject to
a particular metric used to measure the length of short-
est paths between pairs of nodes), or, somewhat more
specific to the hyperlink structure of the internet, the
“PageRank” [19] relevance measure for web pages.
In the presented work we focus on types of networks,
which are completely different from scale free graphs.
The networks considered here are constructed from sets
of points distributed in the two-dimensional Euclidean
plane. More precisely, we consider three types of proxim-
ity graphs, namely relative neighborhood graphs (RNGs)
[20], Gabriel graphs (GGs) [21], and Delaunay triangu-
lations (DTs) [22]. These are planar graphs [23] where
pairs of nodes are connected by undirected edges if they
are considered to be close in some sense (see defini-
tions in Sec. II). In addition, we consider also a certain
2type of (non planar) geometric random network, termed
minimum-radius graph (MR), where pairs of nodes are
connected if their distance does not exceed a particular
threshold value. The above proximity graphs where al-
ready studied in different scientific fields such as the sim-
ulation of epidemics [24], percolation [25–28], and mes-
sage routing and information dissemination in ad-hoc
networking [29–32]. To elaborate on the latter point,
proximity graphs find application in the construction
of planar “virtual backbones” for ad-hoc networks, i.e.
collections of radio devices without fixed underlying in-
frastructure, along which information can be efficiently
transmitted [29, 33–36]. Routing with guaranteed node-
to-node connectivity (at least in a multi-hop manner) is
especially important to ensure a complete broadcast of
information in ad-hoc networks [29]. Here, we consider
three types of node removal strategies with different lev-
els of severity, see Sec. III, and we numerically assess the
threshold fraction of removed nodes (characteristic for
the particular graph type and node deletion scheme) that
suffices to decompose the underlying graphs into “small”
clusters.
The remaining article is organized as follows. In Sec.
II we introduce the four different graph types that were
considered in the presented study. In Sec. III we describe
the three node-removal strategies that were used in or-
der to characterize the fragmentation process for each of
these graph types. In Sec. IV we introduce the observ-
ables that were recorded during the fragmentation proce-
dure and we list the results of our numerical simulations.
Finally, Sec. V concludes with a summary.
II. GRAPH TYPES
Subsequently we introduce four different types of
graphs for a planar set of, say, N points and we charac-
terize the fragmentation process on each of these graph
types following three different node-removal strategies,
detailed in Sec. III. Three of these graph types, intro-
duced in Subsects. II A through II C belong to the class
of proximity graphs [37]. The fourth graph type, de-
tailed in Subsect. II D, is a particular type of a ran-
dom geometric graph. Below, a graph is referred to as
G = (V,E), where V comprises its node-set (N = |V |;
where N is also referred to as “system size”), and where
E (M = |E|) signifies the respective edge-set [23]. Each
of the N nodes u ∈ V represents a point in the two-
dimensional unit square for which the coordinates ux and
uy are drawn uniformly and independently at random. So
as to compute the distance dist(u, v) between two nodes
u, v ∈ V we consider the Euclidean metric under which
dist(u, v) = [(ux− vx)2+(uy − vy)2]1/2. We further con-
sider open boundary conditions. Thus an increase of the
system size corresponds to increasing the density of nodes
on the unit square. On the other hand, so as to maintain
the density of nodes while increasingN , the networks can
be pictured as having an effective side-length L =
√
N .
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
FIG. 1: Examples of the four different graph types for a
small set of N = 5 nodes (see text for details). (a) instance of
a RNG, where for all pairs of nodes that will be connected un-
der the respective linking-rule, the respective lune is depicted
in gray. (b) instance of a GG, where for all pairs of nodes
that will be connected under the respective linking-rule, the
circle that helps in the decision making process is depicted
in gray. (c) instance of a DT, where the gray shaded circles
are exemplary for those that might aid in the decision making
process. (d) instance of a MR, where the linking range r is
depicted (gray circle) for a single node only (all other nodes
exhibit the same linking range).
A common feature of these four types of graphs is that
their edge-set encodes proximity information regarding
the close neighbors of the terminal nodes of a given edge.
The different graph types can be distinguished by the
precise linking-rule that is used to construct the edge-set
for a given set of nodes. In this section the linking-rules
that define the four types of proximity graphs will be
detailed.
A. Relative Neighborhood Graphs (RNGs)
One particular proximity graph type that will be con-
sidered subsequently is the relative neighborhood graph
(RNG) [20]. In order to determine whether in the con-
struction procedure for an instance of a RNG two nodes
u, v ∈ V need to be connected to each other, it is nec-
essary to check if there is a third node w ∈ V \ {u, v}
with dist(u,w) ≤ dist(v, u) and dist(v, w) ≤ dist(v, u). If
such a node w does not exist, u and v will get linked. In
geometrical terms, for each pair u and v of points, the
respective distance dist(u, v) can be used to construct
the lune lune(u, v). The lune is given by the intersection
of two circles with equal radius dist(u, v), centered at u
and v, respectively. If no other point w ∈ V \ {u, v} lies
within lune(u, v), i.e. if the lune is empty, both nodes are
connected by means of an edge. To facilitate intuition,
an example of a RNG for a small set of N = 5 nodes is
sketched in Fig. 1(a). A larger example that illustrates
the principal structure of a RNG is shown in Fig. 2(a).
3B. Gabriel Graphs (GGs)
Another proximity graph that will be considered in
this article is the Gabriel graph (GG) [21, 25]. To de-
termine whether in the construction procedure for an in-
stance of a GG two nodes u, v ∈ V need to be connected,
circ(u, v), i.e. the smallest of all possible circles which
embeds both nodes is considered, which has a diame-
ter dist(u, v). These two nodes will be connected unless
there is another node w which is located within the area
enclosed by circ(u, v). To facilitate intuition, the link-
ing rule for the GG is illustrated in Fig. 1(b). A larger
example that illustrates the principal structure of a GG
is shown in Fig. 2(b). Further, note that the GG is a
super-graph of the RNG. This is due to the circumstance
that circ(u, v), which is relevant in the construction pro-
cedure of a GG instance for a given set of nodes encloses
a subarea of lune(u, v), being relevant in the construction
procedure of the corresponding RNG instance (compare
the grey shaded surfaces in Figs. 1(a,b)). Therefore, all
edges contained in the RNG are also included in the GG.
Note that this can also be seen in Figs. 2(a,b).
C. Delaunay Triangulations (DTs)
The construction of the Delaunay triangulation (DT;
also a type of proximity graph) [22] is quite similar. Two
nodes u, v ∈ V will be connected if any circle exists which
embeds u as well as v but no further nodes. To facili-
tate intuition, the result of this linking-rule is shown in
Fig. 1(c). A larger example that illustrates the princi-
pal structure of a DT is shown in Fig. 2(c). From the
definition of these linking-rules, since the GG graph also
involves the construction of a circle, it is evident that
an instance of a DT for a given set of nodes must be a
super-graph of the corresponding GG instance. As a con-
sequence, being a sub-graph of the GG, the RNG is also
a sub-graph of the DT. This can be observed in Figs.
1(a-c) (Figs. 2(a-c)), where the RNG, GG and DT are
illustrated for the same set of N = 5 (100) nodes.
D. Minimum Radius Graphs (MRs)
The fourth network topology that will be considered
is the minimum radius graph (MR). In the construction
procedure of an instance of a MR, two nodes u, v ∈ V
will be joined by an edge, if dist(u, v) ≤ r. Therein,
the “connectivity radius” r specifies the smallest possible
value which ensures that all nodes are connected to one
another, possibly in a multi-hop manner. It becomes
evident from Figs. 1(d) and 2(d) that, in contrast to the
previous graphs, the MR might feature crossing edges.
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
FIG. 2: Examples of the four different graph types for the
same set of N = 100 nodes, distributed uniformly at random
in the 2D unit square. (a) RNG, (b) GG, (c) DT, and (d)
MR.
E. Graph construction
In order to construct the RNG and GG, we made
use of the sub-graph hierarchy RNG ⊂ GG ⊂ DT.
I.e., for a given set of nodes we first obtained the DT
by means of the Qhull computational geometry library
[38] (the DT for a set of N points can be computed in
time O(N log(N)) [38, 39]) and then pruned the resulting
edge-set E until the linking requirements of GG or RNG
are met. Here, we amend the naive implementation of
this two-step procedure [20], yielding an algorithm with
running time O(N2), by means of the “cell-list” method
[28], resulting in a sub-quadratic running time. In this
regard, note that Ref. [37] provides an overview of several
algorithmic approaches for the construction of RNGs and
GGs. Finally, note that RNGs and GGs can be found as
the limiting cases of a parameters family of proximity
graphs, termed β-skeletons [40].
At this point, note that due to a yet unmentioned prop-
erty of minimum weight spanning trees (MST; i.e. a span-
ning tree in which the sum of Euclidean edge lengths is
minimal, see Ref. [41]) we can set the “connectivity ra-
dius” of MRs, i.e. a geometric random graph, in context
to proximity graphs. Bear in mind that the longest edge
present in any instance of a MR specifies the smallest
possible edge length which ensures that all nodes are con-
nected to one another. Exactly this edge length charac-
terizes the longest edge in the MST of the corresponding
node-set. For a given set of nodes, a MST is a spanning
sub-graph of the RNG [20, 28]. Thus, considering MSTs,
the previously mentioned sub-graph hierarchy can be ex-
tended to MST ⊂ RNG ⊂ GG ⊂ DT. This allows for
a fast construction of a MR instance for a given set of
points via a convenient three-step procedure: (i) compute
4the DT for the given set of points, (ii) filter the edge-set of
the DT to determine the corresponding MST, and, (iii)
use the length of the longest MST edge as “connectiv-
ity radius” to construct the respective MR. Therein, the
overall running time is dominated by step (iii), which,
in its most naive implementation has computational cost
O(N2). Note that during the latter step, the previously
mentioned “cell-list” method can be used to achieve an
improved running time.
Subsequently we will introduce the node-removal
strategies that will be considered in the numerical simu-
lations carried out to characterize the fragmentation pro-
cess for the above graph types.
III. NODE-REMOVAL STRATEGIES
As pointed out above, in the presented article we
aim at characterizing the fragmentation processes for the
graph types introduced in Sec. II. Therefore we consider
three different types of node-removal strategies that are
used throughout the literature [7–11]. For convenience
these will be detailed subsequently. Therefore, note that
the basic procedure to study the fragmentation process
for a single network instance consists in successively re-
moving nodes until the network is decomposed into many
small clusters of nodes, thereby recording observables
that provide information about the current characteris-
tics of the network (see Sec. IV).
The most simplistic node-removal strategy followed
here is termed random failure. According to this strat-
egy, a node is picked uniformly at random and deleted
from the network (along with all its incident edges).
Depending on the context into which the networks are
set, it might be useful to associate a measure of relevance
to each node. Then it is also intuitive to ask for node-
removal strategies that preferentially target the most rel-
evant nodes. Removal strategies that capitalize on the
relevance of a node are termed targeted attacks. Here, we
consider two different targeted attack strategies
(i) degree-based attack (conveniently abbreviated as
“attack 1”), where the relevance of a node is simply mea-
sured by its degree (i.e. the number of its incident edges).
The higher the degree of a node, the more relevant it is
assumed to be. Accordingly, at each elementary node
removal step during the fragmentation process, the node
with the currently highest degree is selected for deletion.
If, at a given step, there are many nodes exhibiting the
currently highest degree, one of these nodes is chosen
uniformly at random. Note that the degree of a node is
a local property only, i.e. for a given node one only has
to determine the number of its nearest neighbors. Thus,
from a computational point of view the node degree is a
very inexpensive relevance measure.
(ii) betweenness-based attack (conveniently abbrevi-
ated as “attack 2”), where the relevance of a node is mea-
sured by its betweenness centrality [18]. The betweenness
centrality of node u is the number of shortest paths be-
tween all node pairs (v, w) (v, w 6= u) that pass through
u. The larger the value of the betweenness centrality, the
more relevant a node is assumed to be. In some applica-
tions, the Euclidean distance along the edges is relevant
for determining shortest paths [41]. However, here we
instead considered the hop-metric, where distances are
simply measured in terms of node-to-node hops. Con-
sequently, the shortest path problem can be solved by
means of a breadth-first search [41]. During each elemen-
tary node-removal step, the node exhibiting the currently
highest value of betweenness centrality gets removed. As
before, if several nodes have the same value, one of them
is chosen uniformly at random. Note that the between-
ness centrality is a global property deduced from the un-
derlying network, i.e. for the betweenness centrality of a
particular node, the configuration of shortest paths be-
tween all pairs of nodes is of relevance. From a computa-
tional point of view this is, of course, considerably more
expensive than the computation of the local node degree.
Subsequently, we will use the above node-removal
strategies in order to characterize the fragmentation pro-
cess for the graph types described in Sec. II by means of
numerical simulations.
IV. RESULTS
In the current section we will report on numerical sim-
ulations for the different graph types for planar sets of
N = 144(= 122) up to 36864(= 1922) points, where re-
sults are averaged over 2000 independent graph instances.
In Sec. IVA we first report on some topological properties
of the graphs, in Sec. IVB the analysis of the fragmenta-
tion procedure is summarized. In Sec. IVC further issues
concerning the resilience of the networks seen as trans-
port networks (“N − 1 stability”) are discussed. Finally,
in Sec. IVC, the networks will be compared under the
assumption that they all exhibit the same summed-up
edge length.
Subsequently, albeit we will present results for all rel-
evant combinations of the four graph types and three
node-removal strategies, we will not show figures with
results for all these combinations. Instead, so as to il-
lustrate the analyses performed in the following section,
we mainly present figures for the RNG proximity graphs
subject to a degree-based node removal strategy.
A. Topological properties
To emphasize structural differences between the graph
types of the sub-graph hierarchy RNG ⊂ GG ⊂ DT we
first consider the respective average node degree. There-
fore, the scaling behavior of the effective, i.e. system-size
dependent, average degree deff(N) is considered and an-
alyzed using a fit to the function deff(N) = d− aN−b/2.
For the three graph types RNG, GG and DT the fits
yield asymptotic degrees d and scaling exponents b, where
510-3
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FIG. 3: Finite-size scaling behavior of the average degree for
the four different graph types. The main plot shows the scal-
ing behavior found for the three types of proximity graph, i.e.
RNG, GG, and DT (see text for details). The inset shows the
logarithmic scaling found in case of the MR graphs (see text
for details).
dRNG = 2.557(1) and bRNG = 0.99(4) (with a reduced
chi-square χ2red = 0.87; note that both, the asymptotic
average degree and the scaling exponent compare well
to the estimates reported in Ref. [28]), dGG = 3.999(1)
and bGG = 1.00(1) (reduced chi-square χ
2
red = 0.70),
dDT = 6.0001(1) and bDT = 1.76(1) (for a reduced chi-
square χ2red = 1.87; note that the average degree of the
DT is known to be dDT = 6). In Fig. 3 the correction to
scaling, i.e. d − deff(N) ∝ N−b/2, is shown for the three
types of proximity graphs. It is interesting to note that
RNG and GG exhibit a similar scaling, involving a cor-
rection of the form N−1/2, whereas the scaling behavior
for the average degree for the DT graphs is governed by a
significantly larger exponent. Also, note that instances of
the three types of proximity graphs are planar, i.e. there
are no crossing edges. While the bounding cycles of the
finite faces for the instances of RNGs and GGs might
consist of an even or odd number of edges, all inner faces
for instances of DTs are bounded by three edges.
Further, for the minimum radius graph we found that
the effective, average degree fits best to a logarithmic
scaling function of the form deff(N) = log(aN), see in-
set of Fig. 3 where a = 15.7(4) (reduced chi-square
χ2red = 1.42; however, note that the data can also be fit
by a scaling function with a small power-law correction
as above, where dMR ≈ 57 and bMR ≈ 0.04).
Regarding MRs, consider that the longest edge present
in any instance of a MST (which specifies the length of
the longest edge in the respective MR instance; see dis-
cussion above) can by no means exceed the length of the
longest edge of any of its super-graphs. Due to the ge-
ometric restrictions imposed by going from an instance
of a DT to a RNG, it is thus plausible that the maximal
edge length found for any MR instance is much shorter
than, say, for the corresponding DT instance. This holds
in particular for the case of open boundary conditions,
where the outer faces of the DT instances feature rather
long edges, see Fig. 2(c). For a set of 500 instances of
point sets consisting of N = 16384 nodes (i.e. for sys-
tems of effective side length L = 128) we found that
the longest edge length ratio rmax/L for the four graph
types read rDTmax/L = 0.714(6), r
GG
max/L = 0.02927(8),
rRNGmax /L = 0.02335(8), and, r
MR
max/L = 0.01548(6). For
the first three graph types, these values should be more or
less independent of the system size. On the other hand,
for the minimum radius graphs we found that the finite-
size scaling behavior of the connectivity radius rMRmax(L)
as function of the effective system length L exhibits a
logarithmic scaling of the form rMRmax(L) = a + b log(L),
where a = 1.334(8) and b = 0.133(2) (reduced chi-square
χ2red = 0.59), supporting the logarithmic scaling of the
average degree. I.e., the respective “connectivity area”
Ar = πr
2
max, which, if centered at the position of a given
node, specifies the area in which all its nearest neigh-
bors can be found, should be almost equal to the previ-
ously discussed average degree deff , because the density
of nodes is unity. E.g., at N = 2304 (i.e. L = 48) we find
Ar = 10.7(2) and deff = 10.52(5).
B. Fragmentation analysis
For the fragmentation analysis we consider instances of
the four different graph types, introduced in Sec. II, and
successively remove nodes according to one of the node
removal strategies, presented in Sec. III, until the initially
connected graph decomposes into small clusters. So as to
determine the critical fraction p of nodes that need to be
removed until the graph decomposes we perform a finite-
size scaling (FSS) analysis for different observables that
are commonly used in studies of percolation [2] in Sec.
IVB 1. In addition, in Sec. IVB 2 we consider the scaling
behavior of the hop-diameter, i.e. the longest among all
shortest paths measured in terms of node-to-node hops,
which, e.g., is relevant in the context of broadcasting
problems on networks [29].
TABLE I: Critical points pc, i.e. fractions of removed nodes
which indicate when the underlying network decomposes into
“small” clusters for the different graph types and node re-
moval strategies, discussed in Secs. II and III (random fail-
ure: equivalent to random percolation; attack 1: degree-based
node removal strategy; attack 2: centrality-based node re-
moval strategy), respectively.
strategy RNG GG DT MR
random failure 0.205(1) 0.365(1) 0.500(2) 0.71(1)
attack 1 0.120(1) 0.263(1) 0.377(1) 0.68(2)
attack 2 0 0 0 0
61. Analysis of typical percolation observables
The observables we consider below can be rescaled fol-
lowing a common scaling assumption. Below, this is for-
mulated for a general observable y(p,N). This scaling
assumption states that if the observable obeys scaling, it
might be written as
y(p, L) = L−b f [(p− pc)N1/(2ν)], (1)
wherein ν and b represent dimensionless critical expo-
nents (or ratios thereof, see below), pc signifies the crit-
ical point, and f [·] denotes an unknown scaling function
[2, 42]. Following Eq. 1, data curves of the observable
y(p,N) recorded at different values of p and N collapse,
i.e. fall on top of each other, if y(p,N)N b/2 is plotted
against ǫ ≡ (p − pc)N1/(2ν) and if further the scaling
parameters pc, ν and b that enter Eq. 1 are chosen prop-
erly. The values of the scaling parameters that yield the
best data collapse determine the numerical values of the
critical exponents that govern the scaling behavior of the
underlying observable y(p,N). In order to obtain a data
collapse for a given set of data curves we here perform a
computer assisted scaling analysis, see Refs. [43, 44].
a. Order parameter: As first observable we consider
smax, i.e. the relative size of the largest cluster of con-
nected nodes. Averaged over different instances of, say,
size N , at a given value of p this yields the order param-
eter
〈P (p)〉 = 〈smax(p)〉. (2)
This observable scales according to Eq. (1), where b =
β/ν and β is the order-parameter exponent. The data
curves for the RNG proximity graphs for all three types
of node removal strategies are shown in Fig. 4(a).
For the RNG and GG, the random failure node re-
moval strategy simply corresponds to ordinary random
percolation. An extended study of site and bond perco-
lation for the RNG type proximity graphs can be found
in Ref. [28] and in Ref. [45] for the GG type proximity
graphs, respectively. However, note that in these arti-
cles p signifies the fraction of occupied bonds/nodes as
opposed to the fraction of deleted nodes. The respec-
tive values of pc are listed in Tab. I. It is apparent, that
in the order RNG, GG, DT and MR, the graphs be-
come less and less susceptible to fragment under random
node removal. This correlates well to the average degree
dRNG < dGG < dDT < deff,MR(N).
Regarding the degree-based attack strategy for the
RNGs we found that the best data collapse (obtained
for the three system sizes N = 2304, 4096, 9126 in the
range ǫ ∈ [−1, 1]) yields pc = 0.120(1), ν = 1.33(2), and
β = 0.148(8) with a quality S = 3.63 (see Refs. [43, 44]),
see Fig. 4(b). Note that the numerical values of the crit-
ical exponents match the expected values for 2D perco-
lation, i.e. ν = 4/3 ≈ 1.333 and β = 5/36 ≈ 0.139, quite
well. Restricting the data analysis to the slightly smaller
interval ǫ ∈ [−0.65, 0.65], enclosing the critical point on
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FIG. 4: Finite-size scaling analysis for the RNG proximity
graphs. (a) order parameter for RNGs subject to the three
node removal strategies discussed in Sec. III. (b) the main plot
shows the best data collapse of the order parameter obtained
for a degree-based node removal strategy, the inset illustrates
the scaling of the area under curve for a centrality-based node
removal strategy. The fact that the area seems to converge
to zero is compatible with a critical point pc = 0. (c) the
main plot shows the best data collapse for the average size
of the finite clusters considering a degree-based node removal
strategy, the inset shows the scaling of the peak position.
the rescaled p-axis, the optimal scaling parameters are
7found to be pc = 0.119(1), ν = 1.41(5), and β = 0.14(1)
with a quality S = 0.98. Further, fixing ν and β to
their exact values, thus leaving only one parameter to
adjust, yields pc = 0.119(1) with a data-collapse quality
S = 3.16. Hence, for RNGs subject to a degree-based
attack strategy, a fraction of pc = 0.119(1) seems to suf-
fice in order to decompose the graph instance into small
clusters. Note that this is already significantly smaller
than the above value found for the case of random node
failures.
The analysis for the proximity graph types GG and
DT for the above two node-removal strategies (i.e. ran-
dom failure and degree-based attack) were carried out in
similar fashion. For the DT ensemble, considering the
degree-based node-removal strategy, the scaling parame-
ters obtained by the FSS analysis read pc = 0.377(1), ν =
1.31(7), and 0.14(2) with a data-collapse quality S = 0.89
(obtained for the three system sizes N = 2304, 4096, 9126
in the range ǫ ∈ [−0.5, 0.75]). For comparison: the
critical point for the random node removal strategy is
known to be pc = 0.5; from our simulated data we find
pc = 0.500(2), ν = 1.35(13), and β = 0.13(2) with a
quality S = 0.94 (similar system sizes as above, only in
the range ǫ ∈ [−0.25, 0.25]).
For the case of the GG graphs, we found pc = 0.263(1),
ν = 1.33(4) and β = 1.4(2) in respect to the degree-based
node-removal strategy (obtained for the system sizesN =
2304, 4096, 9126 in the range ǫ ∈ [−0.2, 0.7] with quality
S = 1.08).
However, note that for the geometric MR graphs, an
analysis of the order parameter following a scaling as-
sumption of the form of Eq. 1 did not lead to any conclu-
sive results. I.e. the data curves did not give a satisfac-
tory data collapse. Nevertheless, based on the analysis
of the fluctuations of the order parameter, we were able
to obtain estimates for the critical point, see below. In
summary, as obvious from Tab. I, degree-based attacks
are more severe than random removals. Again, the re-
silience against attacks correlates well with the average
degree.
Considering the centrality-based attack strategy for the
RNGs, we start out with a more simplified initial anal-
ysis. As evident from Fig. 4(a), the data curves that
describe the scaling of the order parameter for this setup
drop to zero at rather small values of p. Thus, a FSS anal-
ysis (as carried out above) comes along with several dif-
ficulties (related to the accessibility of data points in the
critical scaling window). Hence, we first determine the
area A(N) under the order-parameter curves and assess
its scaling behavior with increasing system size N to see
whether it converges to a finite value at all. From a fit to
the function A(N) = a(N +∆N)−b we find a = 0.20(1),
∆N = 30(4), and b = 0.315(3) (reduced chi square
χ2red = 0.34; see inset of Fig. 4(b)), indicating that in-
deed A(N →∞)→ 0. If we neglect the smallest system,
we find that a pure power law A(N) = 0.270(3)N−0.302(2)
fits the data well (reduced chi-square χ2red = 0.65). From
this we conclude that for RNGs, subject to a centrality-
based attack strategy one has pc = 0. Following this
procedure, we also found that under this attack strategy
pc = 0 holds true for GGs, DTs, and MRs. Thus, due to
its propensity to fragment graphs at negligible values of
p, this strategy is much more efficient than the degree-
based strategy, independent of the type of graph.
b. Average size of the finite clusters As second ob-
servable we consider the average size 〈Sfin(p)〉 of all finite
clusters for a particular graph instance, averaged over dif-
ferent graph instances. The definition of this observable
reads [2]
Sfin(p) =
∑′
s s
2 ns(p)
∑′
s s ns(p)
, (3)
where ns(p) signifies the probability mass function of
cluster sizes for a single graph instance at a given value
of p. The prime indicates that the sums run over all clus-
ters excluding the largest cluster for each graph instance.
The average size of all finite clusters is expected to scale
according to Eq. 1, where b = −γ/ν. Therein, for 2D
percolation, the critical exponent γ assumes a value of
γ = 43/18 ≈ 2.389.
Again, a detailed analysis of this observable for ran-
dom percolation, which is equivalent to the random fail-
ure node-removal strategy, can be found in Ref. [28] re-
garding RNGs, and in Ref. [45] with respect to GGs.
Regarding the degree-based attack strategy for RNGs,
considering systems of size N = 1024, 2304, 4096, 9216
and restricting the data analysis to the interval ǫ ∈
[−0.5, 0.5] on the rescaled p-axis, the optimal scaling pa-
rameters are found to be pc = 0.120(1), ν = 1.46(3), and
γ = 2.35(4) with a collapse quality S = 0.91, see Fig.
4(c). Note that here the estimated value of ν appears to
overestimate the expected value somewhat. Apart from
that, the numerical values of the extracted exponents are
in reasonable agreement with their expected values and
the estimate of the critical threshold pc is consistent with
the numerical value found from an analysis of the order
parameter.
In addition to the full FSS analysis, we also per-
formed a scaling analysis for the effective critical points
ppeak(N) at which the curves of Sfin assume their max-
imum. Therefore, polynomials of 5th order were fitted
to the data curves at different system sizes N in order
to obtain an estimate ppeak,i(N) of the peak position.
Thereby, the index i labels independent estimates of the
peak position as obtained by bootstrap resampling. For
the analysis, we considered 20 bootstrap data sets, e.g.
resulting in the estimate ppeak(N = 9216) = 0.1057(4)
for the RNG regarding the degree-based attack strategy.
Considering systems of size N > 500 and assuming the
scaling form
ppeak(N) = pc,peak − aN−b, (4)
we yield the fit parameters pc,peak = 0.111(1), b = 0.50(3)
and a = O(1) for a reduced chi-square χ2red = 0.08, see in-
set of Fig. 4(c). This result indicates that the peak seems
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FIG. 5: Finite-size scaling analysis for the peak position of the
finite-size susceptibility curves for the MR geometric graphs.
(a) the main plot shows the data curves for the random node
removal strategy and the inset illustrates the finite size scaling
of the respective peak positions (see text for details). (b) the
main plot shows the data curves for the degree-based node
removal strategy and the inset illustrates the finite size scaling
of the respective peak positions (see text for details).
to be positioned off criticality at a value slightly below pc,
cf. Fig. 4(c). However, including also very small systems
we yield pc,peak = 0.119(5), b = 0.29(6) and a = O(1) for
a reduced chi-square χ2red = 3.89, in good agreement with
the value of pc obtained from an analysis of the order pa-
rameter. Following this procedure by considering RNGs
subject to a random node failure we yield pc = 0.196(8),
which compares well to estimate obtained from an anal-
ysis of the order parameter (see Tab. I). An analysis of
the peak positions for all other types of proximity graphs
led to qualitatively similar results. Hence, we do not
elaborate on them here.
Whenever we analyzed the order parameter, we also
analyzed the respective fluctuations, giving rise to the
finite-size susceptibility χ(p)
χ(p) = N [〈s2max(p)〉 − 〈smax(p)〉2]. (5)
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FIG. 6: Finite-size scaling analysis for the peak position of
the diameter curves for the RNG proximity graphs subject
to a degree-based attack strategy. The main plot shows the
diameter of the graphs as function of the removed fraction
of nodes following the attack strategy “attack 1” (discussed
in Sec. III). The inset illustrates the scaling behavior of the
effective peak position ppeak(N) as function of the system size
N .
These curves also feature a pronounced peak and exhibit
the same scaling behavior as the average size of the fi-
nite clusters discussed above. Here, we also performed a
scaling analysis of the peak positions of the χ(p) curves,
similar to that performed for the peaks of the previous
observable. Albeit this did not lead to new insight for
the various types of proximity graphs, it was a valuable
method to estimate critical points for the MR geometric
graphs. In this regard, for MRs subject to a random node
removal we find pc = 0.71(2), see Fig. 5(a). Further, for
MRs subject to the degree-based node removal strategy
we obtain pc = 0.68(2), see Fig. 5(b). Hence, for the
MRs we cannot rule out that the estimates for both crit-
ical points actually agree within error-bars. This might
be attributed to the rather high degree of the individual
nodes, and, from a statistical point of view, the exten-
sive overlap of the individual node-neighborhoods within
the range of the underlying “connectivity radius”. Hence,
due to the high number of redundant node-to-node paths
which easily allow to compensate for deleted nodes, the
effect caused by the removal of a randomly chosen node
does not differ much from the effect caused by the re-
moval of a node with a particularly large degree.
2. Analysis of the hop diameter:
The last observable, studied in the context of the frag-
mentation analysis is related to the diameter R(p) of the
graphs as function of the fraction p of removed nodes.
Here, the diameter of a graph indicates the longest among
all finite shortest paths. In Fig. 6, the data curves of
9the diameter for the particular choice of RNG proximity
graphs subject to a degree-based node removal strategy
are shown. For the particular case of non-fragmented
RNGs, i.e. at p = 0, the diameter (averaged over dif-
ferent realizations of point-sets) was previously found to
scale as 〈R〉 ∝ N1/2 [28]. In view of these prior results,
the data curves in Fig. 6 are scaled so as to assume a fixed
value at p = 0. As evident from the figure the data curves
assume a peak value when a certain fraction of nodes is
removed. This appears to be quite intuitive: if nodes are
removed from one of the graph instances introduced in
Sec. II, redundant edges will disappear (on average) re-
sulting in an increasing node-to-node distance. As soon
as the value of p exceeds the percolation threshold of
the respective setup (i.e. graph type and node removal
strategy), the graph instance decomposes into several
“small” clusters accompanied by a decreasing node-to-
node distance. With increasing system size N , the po-
sition ppeak(N) of the peak shifts towards larger values
of p. For RNGs subject to a degree-based node removal,
a fit-function of the form similar to Eq. 4 yields the fit
parameters pc = 0.120(2), a = O(10
−1) and b = 0.30(2)
(χ2red = 0.90). Similarly, for DTs we find pc = 0.378(4),
a = O(10−2) and b = 0.3(2) (χ2red = 0.14). The re-
sulting asymptotic peak positions are in good agreement
with the value obtained from a FSS analysis of the or-
der parameter, cf. Tab. I. For the case of a random node
failure, the results obtained from the scaling of the peak
position fits the results from the order parameter anal-
ysis similarly well. E.g., for the case of RNGs we find
pc = 0.199(2), cf. Tab. I. Albeit we performed a simi-
lar analyses for GGs and DTs, resulting in qualitatively
similar results, we do not elaborate on them here. No
analyses were performed for the centrality-based node
removal strategy.
C. N − 1 resilience
The actual most important application example re-
garding proximity graphs are wireless ad hoc networks.
Nevertheless, there might be some other fields of applica-
tion for them. Proximity graphs ensure connectivity and
the total length of all involved edges is small in compari-
son to many other networks that feature this quality. For
applications where edges are expensive and connectivity
is crucial, the topology of proximity graphs might be a
good candidate to install. Up to here, we have assumed
that the capacities of the edges and nodes are infinitely
large, so the network components do not overload, re-
gardless how intensive they get strained. In real scenar-
ios, if some nodes or edges malfunction, network compo-
nents which are hardly used under normal circumstances
might become essential at once. In consequence, since
the hardly used components are not designed to handle
such a burden, this might trigger a cascading breakdown
of the whole network [46–49]. Therefore, it is reasonable
to equip all network components with sufficient capacity.
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FIG. 7: Probability mass function of the backup capacity,
which is needed to ensure N−1 stability (see text) ∆bnode for
different network topologies (initial system size: N = 1024).
The probability mass function concerning this measure has
been made by analyzing 40000 realizations of the disorder.
The data has been fitted by a log-normal distribution with
moderate quality (reduced χ2red between 0.65 and 4.46).
To ensure that the network operates orderly under all
circumstances when one component drops out, referred
to as “N − 1 resilience” (or N − 1 stability, or N − 1
criterion), it is necessary to know the most adverse sce-
nario that can happen. When having a transport model
in mind, where some quantities have to be transported
between all pairs of nodes, [46, 48, 49] the betweenness
centrality [50] is a measure of the capacity each node
or edge has to provide in a well functioning situation.
When one node or edge fails, given that the network is
still connected, the loads have to be redistributed, visi-
ble from a recalculation of the betweenness centrality. In
some nodes or edges the centrality will increase [51, 52],
corresponding to a higher capacity these nodes or edges
have to provide a priori. The value of the highest in-
crement, which is called backup capacity [52] ∆bnode or
∆bedge, provides an estimate for the additional costs for
each node or edge that must be invested to protect the
network against cascading failures upon such an incident.
The betweenness centrality has been calculated based
on Dijkstra’s algorithm [41], i.e. the edge lengths have
been taken into account for calculating the shortest path.
The resulting probability mass functions of ∆bnode and
∆bedge are illustrated in Fig. 7 and 8, respectively, for
different network ensembles.
For the case of ∆bedge however, using a breadth-first
search, i.e., without taking the actual edge lengths into
account, the probability mass functions look qualitatively
almost identical to the case of ∆bnode without notable dis-
tinctions. From the statistics mediated by the figures it is
evident that the typical backup capacity of DT networks
is smallest while of RNG networks it is the highest. This
means that the structure of the network of RNG networks
is more vulnerable such that one has to invest more into
the capacity of the edges in order to ensure N − 1 stabil-
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FIG. 8: Probability mass function of ∆bedge for different
network topologies (initial system size: N=1024). Removing
the edge featuring the largest betweenness centrality value,
the largest increment of the betweenness centrality of the
other edges ∆bedge has been monitored. The probability mass
function concerning this measure has been made by analyzing
40000 realizations of the disorder. The data has been fitted by
a log-normal distribution with good quality for GG (reduced
χ2red=0.26) and RNG (reduced χ
2
red=2.71), but poor quality
for MR (reduced χ2red=5.2) and DT (reduced χ
2
red=12.2).
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FIG. 9: Probability mass functions of (a) M ·∆bedge and (b)
〈ℓ〉 ·M ·∆bedge for different network topologies at N =1024.
M describes the number of edges in the respective graph and
〈ℓ〉 denotes their respective edge-length mean value. The data
has been fitted by a log-normal distribution with predominant
low quality (regarding (a): reduced χ2red = 6.5 for GG data,
reduced χ2red=4.99 for RNG data and reduced χ
2
red=12.75 for
DT, regarding (b): reduced χ2red =2.9 for GG data, reduced
χ2red=5.34 for RNG data and reduced χ
2
red=20.09 for DT)
ity. This is not surprising, since the RNG is a sub-graph
of the GG and DT and includes less edges. On the other
hand, due to the lack of the additional edges of the RNG
in comparison to the others, the investment to provide
the backup capacity must be applied for less edges. Thus,
it makes sense to ask for the total backup capacity, either
per edge, if investments cost are dominated by the num-
ber of connections, or per unit length, if investments are
dominated by the length of the edges. It becomes evident
from Fig. 9(a) that for the former case, the typical total
investment (M ·∆b) is relatively speaking still the same
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FIG. 10: The scaling behavior of the total edge length ℓtot
of the RNG, GG and DT. Each data point has been created
by averaging over 2000 instances. In each case the total edge
length seems to scale according to ℓtot ∼ N
0.5 for large sys-
tems. We used the fit function ℓtot = a(N + b)
c. By taking
the system sizes N = 2304, 4096, 9216, 16384 into account, we
found a = 4.02(2), b = 19(5), c = 0.4868(4) for the DT (χ2red
= 2.44), a = 1.91(1), b = −47(5), c = 0.5039(5) for the GG
(χ2red = 1.31) and a = 0.99(1), b = −20(3), c = 0.5024(3) for
RNG (χ2red = 0.46).
for all three ensembles. For the second case, i.e., taking
also edge lengths into account (Fig. 9(b)), it turns out
that the investment of the DT is about the same level as
the RNG. The GG appears to be the most cost efficient
graph if this scenario is at hand.
D. Networks with same total length
To compensate for the simple resilience effect created
by simply exhibiting more edges, we also compared the
different topologies of the proximity graphs featuring the
same total edge length ℓtot. Therefore, we measured the
scaling behavior of this quantity for the different prox-
imity graph types (see Fig. 10). The figure provides the
number of nodes which have to be added to the RNG
and GG in order to get same total edge length as the
respective DT. E.g., it is evident from the figure that a
DT with N = 718 nodes has the same total edge length
ℓtot = 100 on average as a GG with N = 2625 and a
RNG with N = 9783 nodes. Since the fragmentation
thresholds for the different node-removal strategies are
known (Tab. I), it can be calculated easily (N · pc) for
each topology howmany nodes must be removed until the
respective network decomposes into small clusters. E.g.,
if ℓtot = 100, the RNG will tolerate 2005 randomly re-
moved nodes. In contrast, the GG tolerates 958 and the
DT tolerates merely 359 nodes that fail randomly. As a
consequence, implementing the topology of the RNG will
be the most reasonable, if installing edges is much more
expensive than adding further nodes. Certainly, the ad-
ditional edges of the DT and GG increases the stability,
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but the benefit of those is small in comparison to the
edges which are contained in the RNG anyway.
V. CONCLUSION
In the presented article, the robustness of three types
of proximity graphs and a particular geometric random
graph (see Sec. II), i.e. their ability to function well even
if they are subject to random failures and targeted at-
tacks, was put under scrutiny. For this purpose we
generated instances of the considered graph types and
successively removed nodes according to three different
node removal strategies (see Sec. III). Once the fraction
of removed nodes exceeds a certain threshold (charac-
teristic for the particular graph type and node deletion
scheme), the underlying graph instance decomposes into
many small clusters. Using standard observables from
percolation theory (see Sec. IVB), the critical node re-
moval thresholds were determined for the different graph
types and deletion strategies, see Tab. I. Therein, so as to
yield maximally justifiable results through numerical re-
dundancy, we considered various observables to estimate
the critical points and exponents. In order of increas-
ing severity, these strategies have an intuitive order: a
random node removal mechanism, equivalent to ordinary
random percolation, is less severe than a degree-based
node removal strategy which takes into account partic-
ular node-related local details (i.e. the node-degrees) to
optimize the order of node removals during the fragmen-
tation procedure. As evident from Tab. I, both removal
schemes result in finite critical points. The latter strat-
egy is again less severe than the centrality-based node
removal mechanism, which takes into account global in-
formation (i.e. the set of shortest paths that connect all
pairs of nodes) which is used to impose a maximally effi-
cient structural damage by preferentially removing nodes
with maximal betweenness centrality (i.e. the most rele-
vant nodes). As evident from Tab. I and the discussion
in Sec. IVB, the latter node removal scheme requires to
delete only a negligible amount of nodes until the graph
decomposes into small clusters. A peculiar result are the
fragmentation thresholds related to the random failure
and degree-based node removal for the MR geometric
graph. As discussed in Sec. IVB we cannot rule out that
the estimates for both critical points agree within error-
bars. This might be attributed to the extensive overlap
of the individual node-neighborhoods within the range
of the underlying “connectivity radius”. Hence, due to
the high number of redundant node-to-node paths which
easily allow to compensate for deleted nodes, the effect
caused by the removal of a randomly chosen node does
not differ much from the effect caused by the removal of
a node with a particularly large degree.
For a given node removal strategy, the sequence of crit-
ical points for the sub-graph hierarchy RNG ⊂ GG ⊂ DT
follow the commonly accepted belief that the percolation
threshold (or here: the fragmentation threshold) is a non
decreasing function of the average degree. This is in full
accord with the containment principle due to Fisher [53],
stating that if G′ is a sub-graph of G, then it holds that
pG
′
c ≤ pGc for both, bond and site percolation.
Finally, we considered the backup capacity, which is
the largest betweenness-centrality increment of the nodes
(or edges) after removing the most important node (or
edge) beforehand, for the different graph types. Thus,
via sufficient backup a graph is made N − 1 resilient.
Regarding the three studied proximity graph ensembles,
it turned out that the DT is the most cost efficient one
assuming that the backup investments are dominated by
improving the nodes. On the other hand, if one has to
backup the edges, the more cost efficient one will be ei-
ther DT or GG, depending on whether the investment
depends mainly on the number or on the length of the
edges.
For further studies, it would be very interesting to eval-
uate these simple spatial planar ensembles in the context
of more complex transportation networks, like for steady
state power grids in the power-flow approximation, [54]
or for networks of truly dynamically coupled oscillators
as for Kurmatoto-like models[55–57].
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